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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE P. HANSON, 
-vs.-
Plaintiff and Respond enf, ) 
GENERAL BUILDERS SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and STEPHEN G. KNIGHT, 
Defendarnts and Appellants. 
\, 
( 
) 
Case 
No. 9884 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent considers the Statement of Facts in 
appellant's brief to be incomplete, and to assist the 
Court in considering the points raised in appellant's brief 
and hereinaftre discussed \Ve are summarizing the facts 
as follows: 
On August 31, 1960, at about 11:30 a.m., the plain-
tiff was stopped in the left-turn lane facing east at the 
intersection of 21st South and State Street. He was driv-
ing a one-half ton Dodge pickup truck. (R. 42, 43) The light 
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was red, and he was stopped jut before the crosswalk in 
the lane reserved for left turn only. After the collision 
he was knocked forward about 15 or 20 feet beyond the 
crosswalk so that his vehicle was knocked forward about 
25 or 30 feet by the impact of defendant's truck. (R. 45, 
46) Plaintiff's truck was completely stopped at the time 
collision occurred and had been stopped for at least 30 
seconds, ... or ma.ybe a little longer." His turn signals 
were on, and his brake lights were in operating condition 
at the time he stopped. ( R. 47) 
At the scene of the collision, the truck dri\'er stated 
that his brakes failed and he couldn't stop. (R. 48) 
The hinges were broken off of the end-gate of the 
plaintiff's truck, and there was damage to the tail-light 
and fender. (R. 50) Plaintiff's truck had a heavy angle 
bar welded across the back and under the frame and at the 
end of the frame to support the towbar attachment, and 
this heavy bar extended all the way out even \\'ith the 
end gate of the truck, and this angle iron was so situated 
on plaintiff's truck as to prevent a forcible impact from 
doing further damage to his truck. (R. 116, 117) 
Plaintiff was probably 20 feet or so from the inter-
section when the light changed to red. Plaintiff ·was the 
first car there and was right at the crosswalk. (R. 159) 
The defendant, Stephen G. !{night, testified that he 
had a Class A chauffeur's license which permitted him 
to drive big trucks and that the truck he was driving, at 
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the time of the collision, was a 1950 ton-and-a-half flat-
bed Ford. (R. 171) 
He was making a delivery on behalf of the defendant 
corporation but did not remember where he was going, 
but he was driving easterly on 21st South at about 11 :30 
in the morning when the accident occurred. (R. 172) 
He did not remember the route he took except that he had 
come from 255 West 27th South. He testified as follows: 
''I was going east, as you say, up 21st South. 
Upon coming up to the intersection, I was going 
to stop; I knew this. I applied my foot-brake. 
There was no response, so I pumped it; still noth-
ing; and I applied the hand-brake, which did slo'v 
me down; and that was when I ran into ~Ir. Han-
son." (R. 173) 
The defendant claimed he was traveling approxi-
mately 5 miles an hour when he struck Mr. Hanson's 
truck, and prior to that he was traveling approximately 
30 miles an hour. (R. 173) 
He did not recall seeing any other cars ahead of 
Mr. Hanson. The front end of defendant's truck was still 
in the crosswalk after the impact. (R. 17 4) 
He- had previously driven this 1950 Ford on occasion. 
It was used for incidental deliveries. He had not noticed 
anything unusual about the brakes prior to the time he 
applied the brakes before contact with the plaintiff's 
truck. (R. 176) He had no recollection of a brake appli-
cation after leaving the yard up to the time of the acci-
dent. (R. 177) The General Builder's Supply had about 
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eight newer trucks than the old model 1950 which was 
involved in the collision and the defendant Knight had 
' driven this 1950 truck a few times before the accident 
occurred. The truck generally was used for the delivery 
of merchandise to various areas in the ecity. Newer 
trucks in the yard were preferred to the use of the old 
one. (R. 180) He did not think the 1950 truck was as easy 
to operate as the newer ones. He did not remember test-
ing the brakes of the truck as he was driving it in the 
ya,rd on, the morning of the accident, and for all he knew 
at the trial or knew at the time of the collision, the brakes 
on the truck could have been defective before he ever took 
it out of the yard. (R. 181) 
The witness had been driving since 1956. He had had 
two years of driving experience with the defendant cor-
poration. He had had frequent occasion, because of the 
proximity of General Builders Supply to the intersection 
of 21st South and State Street, to drive through that in-
tersection prior to the accident and was thoroughly fa-
miliar with it. He knew of the semaphore controls, the 
area of the left-turn lane, and the usual condition of traffic 
at 11:30 in the morning. (R. 181, 182) 
He had no recollection whether he saw the plaintiff's 
truck moving before he struck it, and as far as he knew, 
the plaintiff's truck could have been completely stopped 
when the defendant Knight first saw it. He did not re-
call which lane was occupied by the plaintiff's truck. He 
did not recall whether he was intending to make a deliYery 
northerly up State Street on that morning. The left-turn 
lane on the west side of the intersection of 21st South is 
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for vehicles that intend to make a left-turn only. (R. 
183) He had no explanation for the presence of his truck 
in the left~turn lane. (R. 184) 
The red dotted line on Exhibit 1 represents the ap-
proximate location of the defendant's truck in the cross-
walk after the impact, according to the defendant Knight, 
except that he can't remember which lane he was in. He 
could not be sure what caused him to apply the foot 
brake on his truck, whether it was the plaintiff's truck or 
the light. (R. 186) At the time he was applying his 
brakes he didn't know whether the light was green or 
whether it was red, and he doesn't remember whether he 
saw the plaintiff's truck before he applied the brakes or 
not. He did not believe there were any other vehicles 
ahead of him stopped at the intersection to the right of 
plaintiff's truck that would have prevented him from 
proceeding straight ahead if he had been in the southern-
most lane. He did not believe there were any vehicles 
ahead of them. (R. 187) 
In his deposition which was taken sometime prior to 
the trial, the defendant Knight testified as follows. 
'' Q. Now, what was the occasion for trying to 
stop; was it the presence of Mr. Hanson in front 
of you or the change in the traffic light that 
prompted you to start trying to stop? 
"A. It would have been the light." 
Then, on the next page : 
"Q. In other words, )'On observed the light had 
turned red and you started to try and stop the 
forward movement of your truck? 
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''A. Yes. 
'' Q. In doing so, your brakes had failed~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Do you recall so testifying on that occasion~ 
''A. Yes, on that occasion. 
'' Q. So, at that time, you testified that it was 
the red light which prompted you to attempt to 
apply your brakes; and, today, you have testified 
that you didn't know whether it was the light or 
the truck in head of you; is that correct~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Are you in a position to tell us, after being 
refreshed by your deposition, which was the more 
likely reason for your first application of brakes? 
''A. Been the light. 
"Q. And, I take it, that you have no recollection 
of ever seeing Mr. Hanson's truck until the ac-
tual impact occurred~ 
"A. Yes." (R. 188-189). 
The witness Staley testified that he operated the 
Second West Garage R. 190), and he worked on mainte-
nance of trucks as his specialty, and in that connection 
took care of the repair and service work for General 
Builders Supply trucks. (R. 191) 
The witness identified Exhibit 16 as representing a 
work record on the defendant's 1950 model Ford truck. 
The exhibit is undated, but job sheets bearing a number 
before and after, with numbers of 1155 and 1192 indi-
' 
cate that the work may have been done between JulY i 
. ' 
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1960, and July 12, 1960, inasmuch as the witness kept a 
numerical sequence on his work sheets. (R. 194, 195, 196) 
The witness could not explain why the date appear-
ing on Exhibit 16 was written in ink while the rest ·was 
written in carbon, and the witness does not know who 
put that date on. It was usual for the date to be ·written 
in at the time the work order was prepared. (R. 197) 
Exhibit 16 contains the notation: ''Change oil; the 
oil cartridge. Tighten bed, repair lights, tighten front 
spring, and repair signal lights; install front rear spring 
pin. Adjust brakes." (R. 199) 
This work was done by the witness Staley. On cross-
examination he stated that the $12.50 on the Exhibit coY-
ered everything, and when asked what portion of the la-
bor charge was for the adjustment of the brakes: '' Oh, 
I'd say a good dollar and a half; dollar, seventy-five." 
(R. 200) He did not take the brake down to inspect the 
lining. He did not know what condition the lining of the 
brake was in at the time of this brake adjustment. He 
thought the lining was good in May of 1960, although he 
could not recall to what extent the lining was worn in 
jlay. The repair that he took only 20 minutes on was just 
a superficial adjustment of what brake was there, and 
the witness had no way of telling the extent the truck had 
been used between ~[ay and the time of his adjustment. 
(R. 200, 201) 
The witness does all the service work for General 
Builders Supply trucks and has done for five years. He 
desired to continue repairing their trucks. (R. 201) 
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PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES 
The force of the impact injured plaintiff's neck se-
riously and painfully. He supported his head and neck 
when he got out of the truck with his hand. He was dazed 
by the impact, but received no injury other than the in-
jury to his neck. ( R. 49) 
After delivering the transmission which was in his 
truck, the plaintiff went home and lay down all that day 
and was still experiencing pain and discomfort in his 
neck. (R. 51) Plaintiff could not move his head and had 
terrific headaches. The pain in his neck was a sharp, 
cutting pain. Plaintiff's wife applied heat to his neck, 
which seemed to help some, but the pain was worse the 
next day. (R. 52) The following day, plaintiff remained 
in bed the biggest part of the day. (R. 53) 
The pain and stiffness in his neck and pain on at-
tempts to move it continued. For three months he could 
hardly move his head at all, and he went to a chiropractor 
for treatment. (R. 53). The visit to the chiropractor was 
about 10 days after the collision, and the chiropractor 
advised him to see a bone specialist or a doctor. On about 
September 15th, plaintiff went to Dr. Owen Reese, who 
examined him and gave him a drug prescription to relieve 
the pain. At that time, plaintiff could not moYe his head. 
(R. 54, 55) 
About two weeks later he made another visit to Dr. 
Reese and X-rays were taken. Dr. Reese gave him some 
sort of electrical treatment which did not give him much 
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relief. Plaintiff was then referred to Dr. Boyd Holbrook, 
an orthopedic specialist. (R. 56) His condition at the time 
he went to see Dr. Holbrook was about the same, and it 
remained about the same for over a year without much 
change, impairing plaintiff's ability and giving him pain 
whenever he tried to turn. This pain and disability con-
tinues up to the present time. (R. 57) 
About three months after the collision, plaintiff went 
to his garage to check the books and bills as he does his 
own bookkeeping and keeps his own records. (R. 58) 
Prior to the collision, plaintiff spent at least two-thirds 
of his working in overalls in his shop along with the other 
men working on cars in the shop, and one-third of the 
time taking care of the business. (R. 59) He received a 
certificate as "Doctor of Motors" from the Perfect Circle 
l\1anufacturing Company, which was one of the out-
standing awards of the nation as an auto mechanic. Plain-
tilff is trained to do all kinds of auto repair. It was 
about a year after the accident before plaintiff could do 
any car repair at all, and then his work had been re-
stricted to minor jobs- tune-ups and work which would 
not require him to get down under a car. It is now im-
possible for him to get under the dash of a car to fix any 
of the wires or change the gauges because he can't hold 
his head underneath. Plaintiff can't get under the car 
and take down a transmission. Plaintiff is unable to do 
any work '' ... where I have to be laying down or looking 
up under, where I have to hold my head in a horizontal 
position, or something of that type.'' He can tune up a 
motor or overhaul a carburetor, and can put in a new set 
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of points and set the timing, and put in blocks. It was 
at least a year after the accident before he started even to 
do that. (R. 60, 61) If there is a tune-up job in his ga-
rage, or if they have a job he can do, he does it; if they 
don't, then he doesn't. He usually works four or five 
hours a day if there is that kind of work to be done. He 
has had to employ another mechanic for two or three 
hours a day, four days a week, since about one year be-
fore the trial. (R. 62) He also hired another mechanic 
part-time during the year 1961 for about four hours a 
day, four days a week. (R. 63) 
Plaintiff's wife gives him heat treatments and has 
made him a big flannel scarf which he always puts around 
his neck, and he wore a collar prescribed by Dr. Holbrook, 
which he wore constantly for two or three months. (R. 64) 
There has been little or no improvement in the con-
dition of plaintiff's neck for a considerable period of time, 
and prior to the collision on August 31, 1960, he had no 
problems in connection with his neck. He had never 
been unable to perform his work because of pain in his 
neck prior to the collision, and he had never seen a doc-
tor in connection with injuries, nor had he been involved 
in an accident in which his neck was injured at all; he was 
not aware that he had any arthritic problem in his neck 
at all. Prior to August 31, 1960, he had not suffered any 
restriction of movement in his neck and was able to per-
form all of the work of a mechanic in and about an auto-
mobile or a truck without pain or discomfort to his neck. 
(R. 65, 66) 
10 
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Plaintiff is 63 years old and has been an automo-
bile mechanic for 45 years. (R. 131) 
Plaintiff's son helped him an average of 13 or 20 
hours a week up until Christmas of 1960 for a period of 
approximately 4 months (R. 166), and since 1960 and up 
to the time of the trial the son has worked for his father 
from 8 to 10 hours a week without making any charge. 
(R. 168) 
Dr. Owen G. Reese testified that he first saw the 
plaintiff on September 19, 1960. (R. 69) At that time, the 
plaintiff had a stiff and painful neck with limitation of 
motion side to side and in a rotated manner of about 50 
per cent, and he had about 80 per cent restriction of 
flexion and extension. ( R. 70). There was also extreme 
tenderness of the musculature of the back of the neck, 
which was definitely in spasm. (R. 70-A). 
The X-ray showed the patient to have a pre-existing 
osteoarthritis, not related to the accident. (R. 74) Dr. 
Reese testified, in answer to the hypothetical question 
based upon the evidence (R. 76, 77), that, in his opinion, 
the accident was wholly and solely responsible for the 
plaintiff's condition when the witness saw him. (R. 78). 
Dr. Reese, noting that soft tissue whiplash injuries usual-
ly heal within a year, expressed the opinion that hi8 dis-
ability was permanent. (R. 79) 
Dr. Reese described his findings, with respect to 
limitation of motion, as being objective and not based 
upon the subjective complaints of the plaintiff. (R. 84) 
11 
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Dr. Reese testified that the osteoarthritis was not respon-
sible for plaintiff's limitation of motion and was not con-
sistent with it, in his opinion. (R. 85) Dr. Reese testified 
that the 20 per cent permanent disability was due to the 
arthritis that had been triggered from plaintiff's injury. 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook, an orthopedic surgeon for 13 
years in Salt Lake City, testified that he first saw the 
plaintiff on April 28, 1961, at which time his examina-
tion of the plaintiff disclosed marked restriction of the 
motion of the neck, moderate tenderness in the lower part 
of the neck and at the base of the skull. (R. 93, 94) 
Dr. Holbrook saw the plaintiff on November 27, 1962 
(about a week before the trial). (R. 96) At that time, his 
examin.a.tion. disclosed about 50 per cent loss of motion to 
the neck, and there was some tenderness in the neck. This 
loss of motion, inrVolved all movements of the neck. He 
did not h(J/I)e to rely upon the complaint of the patient. 
It was an objective finding. (R. 97) 
In answer to the /rypothetical question based upon 
the evidence, Dr. Holbrook testified that the symptoms ex-
hibited by the witness were the result of the injury. 
(R. 99) He further testified that the plaintiff s·uffered 
a permanent injury, and that his permanent disability 
was approximately 20 per cent bodily impairment - im-
pa.irment of the body as a whole, as it would be difficult to 
think of the neck as functioning separately from the body. 
He further testified that this permanent injury would 
impair plaintiff's ability to work as a mechanic. He 
recommended that the plaintiff have an operation on his 
12 
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neck, which would require hospitalization. (R. 100-101). 
This operation would involve removal of the degenerated 
disc and installation of a bone plug from the hip bone 
and fusion of the vertebrae involved. Dr. Holbrook point-
ed out the various hazards of such an operation. (R. 
102-103) 
Dr. II olbrook was of the opinion that the operation 
would accomplish a 50 per cent improvement, but it was 
possible tha.t the plain,tiff would not obtain any, because 
all operations are not successful. Assuming that the 017-
era.tion wonld be success/ttl, he would still have 10 per 
cent permanent body disability after the operation. He 
testified that the reasonable cost of such an operation 
would be approximately $1,000.00. (R. 105) 
When asked if he had an opinion as to whether 
there ·was a relationship between the necessity for the 
operation and the collision which occurred August 31, 
1960, Dr. Holbrook testified that in his opinion the pre-
cipitating factor creating the plaintiff's present condition 
for which an operation is recommended was the result of 
the injury the plaintiff sustained. (R. 106) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT, HAVING MADE NO OB-
JECTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
BY THE TRIAL COURT OR TO THE WITH-
DRAWAL OF THE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE 
FROM: THE CONSIDERATION OF THE 
JURY, CANNOT NOW COMPLAIN OF ERROR 
IN THIS RESPECT ON APPEAL. 
13 
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The court charged the jury as follows in Instruction 
No.9 D (R.l3): 
"For the purpose of this proceeding, it has 
been determined that the defendants are liable for 
any injury the plaintiff suffered proximately re-
sulting from the automobile collision in question. 
Therefore, you are only required to determine 
what injury to the plaintiff, if any, has been so 
caused, and the amount of damages, if any, that 
plaintiff is entitled to recover as compensation 
therefor. 
"Such a determination of legal liability should 
in no way influence or prejudice you either for or 
against the defendants. You should neither pun-
ish nor reward the defendant on account of such 
determinatj.on. The award you make to the plain-
tiff should be such sum as you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence will fairly and ade-
quately compensate him for injury and damage 
proximately resulting from the negligence of the 
defendant.'' 
At the conclusion of the instructions to the jury, 
counsel for the defendant made the following statement 
in the presence of the Trial Court and counsel for the 
plaintiff: 
''Defendants take no exceptions to the instruc-
tions as given by the Court." (R. 206) 
This was tantamount to an approval of the Court's 
charge removing the issue of negligence from the jury. 
At the time that the instructions were given before the 
jury returned with their verdict, it was the duty of the 
defendants to call to the attention of the trial judge any 
14 
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error in the instructions given to which the defendants 
objected in order that the Trial Court may have had an 
opportunity to consider and weigh the objection and make 
appropriate correction if such correction was indicated. 
Indeed, this principle is recognized in Rule 51, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which, among other things provides: 
''No party may assign as error the giving or 
failure to give instructions unless he objects there-
to. In objecting to the giving of instructions, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to which 
he objects and the grounds for his objection." 
On several occasions this Court has ruled that it 
cannot consider on appeal any error in the instructions of 
the trial court to which no exception was taken. 
In Patton v. Eva.ns, 92 Utah 524, 69 P.2d 969, the 
Court held that where no exceptions were taken the error 
in the instructions was not subject to review. 
More recently, in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah, 2d 266 
272, P. 2d 185, the Court said : 
''No exceptions were taken to these instruc-
tions, nor were they assigned as error in the mo-
tion for a new trial. The law as therein declared 
at the request of the plaintiff became the law of 
the case, especially as far as the plaintiff is con-
cerned .... 
• 'In order that a party may take advantage of 
an error in instructions committed by the trial 
court, he must make a proper objection. 53 Am. 
Jur. 606. Generally, appellate courts will not re-
vimY a ground of objection not raised in the trial 
court. 3 Am. Jur. 116 Appeal and Error 381. The 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
duty is incumbent upon counsel to give the trial 
court the opportunity to correct the error before 
asking the appellate court to review a verdict and 
judgment thereon.'' 
Again, in Steele v. Wilkinson, 10 Utah 2d 159, 349, 
P .2d 1117, the Court said : 
''Error is assigned to the giving of certain in-
structions to the jury. Many of the objections now 
urged on appeal were not urged in the trial court 
and thus need not be considered by this court, 
there being no showing of special circumstances 
why these objections were not made below.'' 
In McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274, P.2d 962, 
the Court said : 
"It must be kept in mind that the language just 
quoted is not the rule but the exception. Normally 
the rules themselves must govern procedure and 
are to be followed unless some persuasive reason 
to the contrary invokes the discretion of the Court 
to extricate a person from a situation where some 
gross injustice or inequity would otherwise 
result.'' 
Counsel for the appellant may claim that he argued 
error in the Court's ruling the defendants negligent as a 
matter of law at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, 
but we are unable to perceive how the appellants could 
inform the court before verdict that they took no excep-
tion to its instructions and then after verdict on a motion 
for a new trial, claim error in the instructions which 
should induce the trial court to grant a new trial on that 
ground. 
16 
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For this court to hold otherwise in this case would 
require the negation of Rule 51 and the reversal of the 
firmly established principles incorporated in the rule. 
See also Siegel v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 4 N.E. 
2d 805 (Ill.). 
In Meadows v. U.S., C.C.A. 4th Circuit, 144 F. 2d 
751, the Court said: 
"On the second point, as to the charge of the 
judge to the jury, the record shows that there 
was no objection to the charge at the time it was 
made. Objections to the charge of the trial judge 
should be called to his attention at the time, and 
if this is not done, the objections cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal. This rule was laid 
down by Taft, C. J., in the case of Brevard Tannin 
Co. v. J. F. Moser Co., e tal., 4 Cir., 288 F. 725, 
731. In that case, Judge Taft said: 'In the face of 
this formidable array of authority from the 2nd, 
5th, 6th and 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, we 
should be inclined to hold that the exceptions in 
this record were not duly reserved and are not 
properly before us.' That is, without exception, 
the rule in federal courts.'' 
Nowhere in the record on appeal does it appear that 
the appellant has, by appropriate objection or exception, 
preserved his right to complain of the trial court's ruling 
that the defendants were negligent as a matter of law. 
Indeed, counsel for appelants flatly told the Court that he 
did not have any exceptions to the instructions given; 
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and as we review the evidence summarized in the state-
ment of facts pertaining to negligence, it would be re-
markable if counsel for the appellants was not himself 
fully persuaded at the conclusion of the trial that the 
defendants were negligent as a matter of law. At any 
rate, it is difficult to perceive how any reasonable person 
could have absolved the defendants from the charge of 
negligence in view of the record, as it more fully and 
clearly will be established in a discussion of the point 
which follows : 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE 
DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENT AS A ~IATTER 
OF LAW. 
The appellants assert in their brief that the collision 
resulted from a sudden brake failure without prior warn-
ing, and the question of negligence in this respect should 
have been submitted to the jury. The appellants cite 
several cases, all of which are distinguishable from the 
case at bar, and in their statement of facts, appellants are 
not altogether accurate in saying that the truck driYcr 
''applied the brakes on several occasions and noted noth-
ing unusual about the brakes". (R. 176, 177). As a matter 
of fact, the defendant Knight stated on cross examination 
that he could not say definitely whether he recalled ap-
plying the brakes after leaving the yard up until the time 
of the accident. Previously he had testified that he had 
not noticed anything unusual about the brakes, but on 
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this 10-year-old Ford truck, it may have been usual for 
the brakes to have been in bad condition. On cross ex-
amination, the defendant }(night testified that he did 
not remember testing the brakes of the truck as he was 
driving it in the yard on the morning of the accident, and 
for all he knew at the trial or knew at the time of the 
collision, the brakes on the truck could have been defective 
before he took it out of the yard. (R. 181). In view of this, 
appellants' claim that the defendant applied his brakes 
on several occasions and noted nothing unusual about 
the brakes was both inaccurate and misleading. 
In the case of Ala,rid v. Vanier (Cal.), 317 P.2d 110, 
quoted by appellants in their brief, the following facts 
appear: 
''The brakes had worked perfectly on numer-
ous occasions during the 10 miles traversed up to 
the point of the accident. The traffic was heavy 
and the driver could not turn out of his lane, 
either to the right or to the left.'' 
In that case, the driver saw the plaintiff's car before 
he applied the brakes. Much differently in the case at bar, 
the defendant Knight did not remember testing the brakes 
of the truck as he was driving it in the yard on the morn-
ing of the accident, nor did he recall using the brake at 
any time on the road prior to the accident; and for all 
he knew, the brakes on the truck could have been defective 
before he ever took the truck out of the yard. Further-
more, he did not see the plaintiff's truck (it had been 
stopped for approximately 30 seconds in the left-turn 
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lane) until the actual impact occurred. In the case at bar, 
there was nothing to prevent the defendant Knight from 
turning to the right to avoid hitting plaintiff's truck when 
his brakes failed, and if he started to apply the brakes 
when the light changed red, as his testimony seems to 
indicate, he had 30 seconds within which time to avoid 
running into the back of plaintiff's truck. The defendant 
Knight could not even explain his presence in the lane 
reserved for left turn only, and for all that appears in 
the record, he could have intended to continue easterly 
on 21st South, except for the collision which resulted 
from a combination of his defective brakes and extra-
ordinary lack of attention to his driving. 
It must be remembered that the condition of the 
brakes on defendants' 10-year-old truck was a matter 
peculiarly within their knowledge, and even if the self-
serving claim that the brakes suddenly failed was al-
together true, there was no testimony given as to the 
actual condition of the brakes on the morning of the 
collision or as to why they failed; and the fact that the 
driver pumped them indicates some previous awareness 
of their defective condition. 
On a later opinion rendered in the case ofAlarid v. 
V a;n,ier, 327 P.2d 897, the California Court stated: 
''In our opinion, the correct test is whether 
the person who has violated a statute has sus-
tained the burden of showing that he did what 
might reasonably be expected of a person of 
ordinary intelligence, acting under similar rir-
cumstances, who desired to comply with the 
law.'' 
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The later decision repudiates in part the earlier 
decision cited by the appellants, although it arrived at the 
same result, and after citing the California statute with 
respect to brakes, which is comparable to our own, the 
California Court in the ALARID case made this further 
statement: 
''The presumption of negligence which arises 
from the violation of a statute is rebuttable and 
may be overcome by evidence of justification or 
excuse .... There is no evidence of contributory 
negligence and, since it is clear from defendant's 
admission that the failure of his brakes was a 
proximate cause of the accident, it follows that the 
defendant would be liable as a ma.tter of la;w in the 
absence of a sufficient excuse or justification for 
violation of the code. 
''A large number of cases, although varying 
considerably in the language used, stand gener-
ally for the proposition that where a person has 
disobeyed a statute he may excuse or justify the 
violation by evidence that he did what might rea-
sonably be expected of a person of ordinary pru-
dence under similar circumstances who desired to 
comply with the standard of conduct established 
by thestatute. (Citing numerous cases)'' 
Section 41-6-144, Utah Code Annotated (1953), pro-
vides, among other things, as follows : 
''Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle 
or motor-driven cycle when operated upon a high-
way shall be equipped with brakes adequate to 
control the movement of and to stop and hold such 
vehicle, including two separate means of apply-
ing thee brakes, each of which means shall be ef-
fective to apply the brakes to at least two wheels. 
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If these two separate means of applying the 
brakes arc connected in any way, they shall be so 
constructed that failure of any one part of the 
operating mechanism shall not leave the motor 
vehicle without brakes on at least two wheels." 
The statute then proceeds to describe the require-
ments for the performance ability of brakes, etc. 
It is obvious in the case at bar that the brakes upon 
the defendants' truck did not comply with the statutory 
requirements and, under the weight of authority, the 
defendants' operation of the truck with defective brakes 
in violation of statute constituted negligence per se. 
8 Am. J ur. 2d, Sec. 702, states : 
"In most states there are statutes which set 
forth specific requirements as to brakes on motor 
vehicles. Before a motorist can be charged with 
negligence by reason of the violation of a statute 
relating to brakes, it must first of all be established 
as a fact that there was a violation. Where the 
violation of a statute containing specific require-
ments as to brakes is established, most authori-
ties support the fact that such violation consti-
tutes negligence per se. Under such a fact, where 
the motorist has done all that can be reasonably 
expected of a person of ordinary prudence to see 
that a vehicle is in proper condition, and an un-
foreseen failure of the brakes occurs, he is not 
usually held guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law. 
"In a number of jurisdictions, the violation 
of a statute relating to brakes is merelv evidence 
of negligence or makes only a prima fa~ie case of 
negligence. Thus, a motorist's Yiolation of a stat-
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ute requiring his vehicle to be equipped with ade-
quate brakes in good working order, and sufficient 
to control the vehicle at all times, does not con-
clusively establish negligence on his part. He may 
defend by sho'''ing proper inspection and a sudden 
failure of brakes without warning; thus showing 
that he did not know and was not chargeable with 
knowledge of the defective brakes. On the other 
hand, where it is in fact shown that he had knowl-
edge of the defective condition of his brakes, or 
that he would have known of their condjtion if he 
had made reasonable tests, he is not excused from 
liability.'' 
JicCoy v. Courtney (Wash.), 172 P.2d 596 at P.601, 
states that: 
''Under the first of these statutes it was the 
positive duty of the respondents to have their 
automobile equipped \Yith brakes capable of hold-
ing the vehicle on any plus or minus grade upon 
which it is to be operated, and a violation of that 
standard would constitute negligence per se. Jack-
lin v. North Coast Transportation. CompG!Yly, 165 
Wash. 236, 5 P .2d 325.'' 
Whether the rule of negligence per se, presumption 
of negligence, or whether the California rule that a per-
son who has violated the statute must sustain the burden 
of showing that he did what might be reasonably expected 
of a person of ordinary intelligence acting under similar 
circumstances who desired to comply \vith the la-vv; 
whether this court accepts any of these rules, the de-
fendants failed miserably and completely to explain or 
excuse their violation of the statute. In the first place, 
there is no direct evidence that the defendant ever applied 
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If these two separate means of applying the 
brakes arc connected in any way, they shall be so 
constructed that failure of any one part of the 
operating mechanism shall not leave the motor 
vehicle without brakes on at least two wheels." 
The statute then proceeds to describe the require-
ments for the performance ability of brakes, etc. 
It is obvious in the case at bar that the brakes upon 
the defendants' truck did not comply with the statutory 
requirements and, under the weight of authority, the 
defendants' operation of the truck with defective brakes 
in violation of statute constituted negligence per se. 
8 Am. J ur. 2d, Sec. 702, states : 
"In most states there are statutes which set 
forth specific requirements as to brakes on motor 
vehicles. Before a motorist can be charged with 
negligence by reason of the violation of a statute 
relating to brakes, it must first of all be established 
as a fact that there was a violation. \Vhere the 
violation of a statute containing specific require-
ments as to brakes is established, most authori-
ties support the fact that such violation consti-
tutes negligence per se. li nder such a fact, \Yhere 
the motorist has done all that can be reasonably 
expected of a person of ordinar~~ prudence to see 
that a vehicle is in proper condition, and an un-
foreseen failure of the brakes occurs, he is not 
usually held guilty of negligence as a rna tter of 
law. 
"In a number of jurisdictions, the violation 
of a statute relating to brakes is merely evidence 
of negligence or makes only a prima facie case of 
negligence. Thus, a motorist's Yiolation of a stat-
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ute requiring his vehicle to be equipped "·ith ade-
quate brakes in good working order, and sufficient 
to control the vehicle at all times, does not con-
clusively establish negligence on his part. He may 
(lPfend by showing proper inspection and a sudden 
failure of brakes without warning; thus showing 
that he did not know and was not chargeable with 
knowledge of the defective brakes. On the other 
hand, where it is in fact shown that he had knowl-
edge of the defective condition of his brakes, or 
that he would have known of their condj tion if he 
had made reasonable tests, he is not excused from 
liability.'' 
JicCoy v. Courtney (Wash.), 172 P.2d 596 at P.601, 
states that: 
"Under the first of these statutes it was the 
positive duty of the respondents to have their 
automobile equipped with brakes capable of hold-
ing the vehicle on any plus or minus grade upon 
which it is to be operated, and a violation of that 
standard would constitute negligence per se. Jack-
lin. v. North Coast Transportation. Company, 165 
Wash. 236, 5 P .2d 325.'' 
Whether the rule of negligence per se, presumption 
of negligence, or whether the California rule that a per-
son who has violated the statute must sustain the burden 
of showing that he did what might be reasonably expected 
of a person of ordinary intelligence acting under similar 
circumstances who desired to comply with the law; 
whether this court accepts any of these rules, the de-
fendants failed miserably and completely to explain or 
excuse their violation of the statute. In the first place, 
there is no direct evidence that the defendant ever applied 
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the brakes or tested the brakes prior to the time when 
it was claimed they suddenly failed, notwithstanding the 
fact that this was a 10-year-old truck which was used 
only when newer trucks were not available, and it is 
rather common knowledge that as trucks get older, brakes 
get poorer unless they are adequately serviced, inspected, 
and maintained. 
A weak attempt was made by the defendants to show 
brake inspection and maintenance, and for this purpose 
they called the witness Staley, who claimed to have made 
an adjustment of the brakes on the defendant's truck 
some seven or eight weeks prior to the day of the colli..: 
sion, and there was no subsequent inspection or service. 
On cross examination, he admitted that he took only 20 
minutes on just a superficial adjustment of what brake 
was there. He did not take the brake down to inspect the 
lining; he did not know what condition the brakes were 
in at the time he made the adjustment in July, and al-
though he claimed the lining was good in l\Ia:T, 1960, he 
could not recall to what extent the lining had been worn. 
Could any reasonable person conclude from such evidence 
that the defendants exercised ordinary care to inspect 
the brakes on the defendants' 10-year-old truck or to 
maintain them in the operating condition required by the 
statute? 
They did n.ot excuse non-compliance with the statute: 
they did not rebut the presumption of negligence; they 
did not sustain the burden of showing that thev did what 
might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary 
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intelligence, who desired to comply with the law. The 
question of the defendants' negligence with respect to 
the failure of the brakes, therefore, became a matter of 
law which was correctly determined by the trial court 
as there was nothing upon which the jury, acting reason-
ably, could have based a finding showing that the de-
fendants discharge their statutory duty with respect to 
adequate brakes. 
It is generally understood by those who operate and 
maintain motor vehicles that brakes do wear out and 
become less efficient with prolonged use, and as the 
brakes wear, 20-minute brake adjustments become less 
effectual in establishing a brake condition that 'will last 
for as long as 8 weeks. There is no testimony in the record 
of any kind that the brakes on this particular truck were 
inspected, serviced, checked, or found to be satisfactory 
during any part of the period of time which intervened 
between the 20-minute adjustment in early July and the 
pumping of an ineffectual brake on the 31st of August. 
Furthermore, the record shows that the defendant 
was not maintaining a proper lookout. It will be recalled 
that the plaintiff had been stopped in the left-turn lane 
for approximately 30 seconds waiting for the red light 
to change, during which time he was constantly delivering 
to vehicles behind him an electrical left-turn signal., If, 
as the defendant Knight claimed, he was prompted to put 
on his brake by the light turning red, he had approxi-
mately 30 seconds within which to determine that his 
brakes weren't going to work and to take other responsi-
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ble action to aYoid colliding with the plaintiff who had 
been in a station&ry position for approximately 30 sec-
onds. According to the defendant l(night 's testimony, 
there were no vehicles in the two lanes of traffic to the 
right of the plaintiff which would have prevented his 
swerving to the right if he had seen the plaintiff's parked 
vehicle before the moment of impact. It is crystal clear 
that the jurors could not have possibly found that the 
plaintiff was other than negligent in maintaining a 
proper lookout and in operating a vehicle without ade-
quate brakes in violation of this statute. The defendant 
did not know where he was going and could not explain 
his presence in the left-turn only lane. There "\vas no 
dispute in the evidence nor was there a question of proxi-
mate cause, nor one of contributory negligence which 
would have warranted the trial court in submitting 
those issues to the jury. 
The case of Lockmoellcr v. K eil, 137 S.\~r. 2d 625 
( l\Io.) cited by the appellaltns is not in point, for in that 
case the vehicle in question had brakes, contemplated 
by the statute, which had been adjusted a week before 
the accident, and the brakes had been used a block east 
of the impact and had worked properly, and there ap-
peared to be no evidence of inattention or failure to main-
tain a lookout in that case as well. 
Similarly distinguishable from the case at bar is 
Trudeau v. Fril!a Construction Company, 62 N .\\~. 2d 
492 (Minn.), cited hy the appellants, in which the brakes 
had previously functioned properly and had been re-
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paired two ·weeks before the accident, and in that rase 
there was no evidence of failure to maintain a proper 
lookout. 
The case of Eddy v. illcAnincll, 347 P.2d 499 (Colo.), 
does not sustain the appellants' position in the case at 
bar as that court held that the accident resulted from 
causes beyond the control of the defendant. 
In the case of Best v. 1-Iuber, 3 U. 2d 177, 281 P.2c1 
208, (Utah), cited by the appellants, the Court said: 
'' ... Because of her self interest and a con-
sideration of the improbability of a sudden and 
complete failure of brakes, which are in good 
working order, the jury might have disbelieved 
this portion of her testimony. Additionally, the 
fact that she says that she pumped the brakes two 
or three times in the instant between the claimed 
brake failure and the crash suggests that she 
knew of at least a weakness in the brakes . . . 
''Plaintiff here produced evidence that there 
was adequate room on the street for the defend-
ant to have turned to the right to avoid the acci-
dent. Defendant herself testified that the hand 
brake was in good working order, but she made no 
attempt to use it or to turn aside. The jury, from 
the undisputed facts, could have found her negli-
gent in either of these particulars; under a gen-
eral instruction of due care, could have found her 
negligent in failing to apply the foot brakes with-
in a reasonable distance from the automobile she 
was approaching.'' 
The matter of the defendants' negligence as a matter 
of law was not raised in that case as the jury had re-
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solved the question of negligence 1n favor of the 
plaintiff. 
Finally, the appellant should take no comfort from 
the rule of Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines, 108 So. 409 
(Miss.), cited by the appellants. In that case, the evidence 
showed that the truck had been inspected on April 26, 
1956, on May 5, 1956, and on J\1ay 12, 1956, and the acci-
dent occurred on May 15, 1956. The J\1ay 12th inspection 
showed that the truck needed no repairs or attention 
of any kind. The brakes had been inspected three days 
before the accident and seemed to be ein proper condi-
tion and were working properly before the accident and 
during the early morning of the accident. The driver had 
made several stops only a short time before the accident 
occurred and had experienced no difficulty in the brakes. 
Moreover, there was evidence which justified the jury in 
finding that the plaintiff was not even injured in that 
case. It occurs to us the only use that could be made of 
the Phillips v. Delta case is that the brakes on a commer-
cial truck ought to be inspected about every week; at any 
rate, the weekly inspections in that case may be indica-
tive of what should have been done in the case at bar. 
There is certainly no parallel in the facts. 
We desire to call the Court's attention to the case 
of Sothoron v. West, (l\1d.) 26 A.2d 16. In that case, the 
Court had given judgment for the defendant, and the case 
was reversed and judgment entered in fayor of the plain-
tiff because the appellate court held that there ·was neo--
e. 
ligence as a matter of law. The Court stated as follows: 
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" 'It is the duty of one operating a motor ve-
hicle on the public highway to see that it is in rea-
sonably good condition and properly equipped so 
that it may be at all times controlled and not be-
come a source of danger.' Huddy Automobile Law, 
"In Blashfield's Cyclopedia ·.of Automobile 
Law and Practice, Perm. Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 2, Sec. 
826, it is said: 'One operating an automobile on 
the streets or highways is bound to take notice 
that he may be called upon to make emergency 
stops, and even in the absence of express regula-
tion, the driver is required, in the exercise of rea-
sonable care, to have his car equipped with brakes 
in such good condition that they can, by the use 
thereof, aid in stopping the car or controlling the 
speed of the car.' 
''In ::\Iaryland we have the express regulation 
contained in Article 56, Sec. 194 (1), ·which reads: 
'Every motor vehicle, except trailers and side cars, 
while in use on the public highways of this state, 
shall be provided with adequate brakes.' 
"In some states having similar statutes, it has 
been held that driving ·with defcetive brakes is 
negligence per se. (See William Harden, Inc. v. 
Harden, 1940, 29 Ala., App. 411, 197 So. 94; !(am-
pee Grocery Co. v. Sauls, 1928, 38 Ga. App. 487, 
144 S.E. 403.) 
''The better and more general rule seems to be 
that failure of brakes to operate makes only a 
prima facie case which the driver may defend by 
showing proper inspections and a sudden failure 
without 'Yarning. (Citing cases) ... 
"The kind of inspection required is stated in 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Negligence, Par-
agraph 300, at comment (C. Inspection), as that: 
' ... which a reasonable man should recognize as 
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necessary.' It is also said, 'The actor's negli-
gence lies in his act of using the defectiYr instru-
ment without adequate inspection, not in his omis-
sion to perform his dnt:T of inspection.' 
''The appellate offered as an excuse for the 
accident the fact that her brakes would not hold. 
She offered no evidence of any inspection. She 
testified to a drive which carried her through a 
number of city blocks and intersections. It is 
almost inconceivable that during the course of 
such a drive she did not at some time or other 
have occasion to use the foot brake. Her testi-
mony, however, negatives this. The question be-
fore us, therefore, is ·whether the fact that her 
brakes suddenly failed her excuses her from the 
charge of negligence, when she has driYen a num-
ber of city blocks without making the slightest 
test of these brakes, and their first use in the 
descent of a steep hill where she has to rely on 
them for her safety and for the safety of the other 
occupants of the highway. 
''We do not think the appellee is excused .. 
This is not the case of a latent defect ·which could 
not have been discovered. A person driving a 
strange car for the first time owes a duty to the 
public to see that there are no obvious defects in 
its mechanism which are apt to cause injury to 
others. Defective brakes are obvious because they 
ran be detected by the simple pressure of the foot. 
The test is so simple that anyone can make it. If 
such a test shows the brakes in working order and 
then they suddenly fail, the driver mav not be 
liable for negligence in driving with the~. If no 
test is made, if the brakes are not even tried the 
. ' dnver cannot rely on a presumption that the ma-
chine is safe. He will not be excused from lia-
bility for the destruction he may cause upon the 
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public highway because he did not know his brakes 
were bad. 
''For the reasons stated, the judgment will be 
reversed, and in accordance with the rule, a judg-
ment will be entered for the appellant against 
the appellee for $123.55 with interest from the 
date of trial and costs here and below.'' 
Similarly, in the case at bar there is no evidence 
that the defendant driver so much as applied his brakes 
on the morning of the accident ·while traversing the dis-
tance from his point of origin to the place of collision 
with the plaintiff, and even if \YC should apply the prima 
facie negligency rule rather than the more general rule 
of negligence per se, the Sothoron case is authority for 
the fact that the appellant in this case was negligent as 
a matter of law. 
In Nettleton v. James, (Ore.) 319 P.2d 879, it was 
held that a violation of statute with respect to adequate 
brakes is negligence as a matter of law. \V e quote from 
the decision as follows: 
''By unbroken line of decisions of this court, 
violation of a statute commanding a certain duty 
is negligencee in and of itself ... The rule was 
applied by this court in a case involving the ade-
quacy of brakes and an instruction that violation 
of the statute was negligence per se was ap-
proved ... 
''The weight of authority supports the fact 
that violation by the driver or owner of an auto-
mobile of a statute containing specific regulations 
as to brakes is negligence per se. Annotation 170, 
ALR 611, 661, and cases there cited. 3-A Am. J ur. 
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382 Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Sec-
tion 249." 
We further quote from this decision at p. 884: 
" ... We think that it is one thing to say that 
a driver who, without fault on his part, skids over 
to the left side of the road, has not viola ted the 
law which requires motorists to keep to the right 
(for how could it be allowed that any such appli-
cation of the statute was intended n ; but quite a 
different thing to hold that, when the legislature 
declared that motor vehicles must be equipped 
with two sets of adequate brakes which shall be 
maintained in good working order, the statute was 
only intended to apply if the driver did not know, 
or had no reason to believe, that his brakes were 
insufficient .... 
"It may be that where an accident is caused 
solely by latent defects in materials employed in 
construction of the braking system which the 
usual and well recognized tests afforded by science 
and art for the purpose failed to detect, the owner 
or operator of an automobile should not be held 
responsible . . ., but there is no evidence in this 
case of latent defects and that question need not 
be decided.'' 
Another case very similar to the case at bar is AllJers 
v. Ottenbacher (S. D. 1962), 116 N.\V. 2d 529. In that 
case, the jury found against the plaintiff on the issue of 
liability and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the fail-
ure of the defendant to comply \Yith the statute with 
respect to maintenance of safe braking equipment con-
stituted negligence as a matter of law. The appellant 
court so ruled, reversing the verdict and holding the 
defendant negligent as a matter of law. 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In that case, the defendant testified that he had ex-
perienced no difficulty with his brakes in traversing the 
distance from his place of residence to the scene of the 
accident until his attempted stop to avoid the collision. 
He further stated that he started to slow his speed when 
he saw the light change and eased up behind the plain-
tiff's car; that when he applied the foot brake it failed, 
and he attempted to pump the brake. 
We quote from the decision as follows : 
''Defendant was required by the provisions of 
this statute to have his car equipped with brakes 
adequate to control the movement of and to stop 
and hold the vehicle and maintained in good work-
ing order. Defendant admittedly was operating 
his car with defective foot brakes and in violation 
of the statute. The question presented is whether 
the violation by the defendant of the statutee con-
taining speceific requirements as to brakes consti-
tues negligence as a matter of law or whether the 
jury, under the facts and circumstancesfi could 
find that defendant ·was not negligent .... 
"It may thus be said that when the driver or 
owner of a motor vehicle violates the specific regu-
lations as to brakes contained in Sec. 44.0346 
supra, he is guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law unless it appears that compliance was excus-
able because of circumstances resulting from 
causes beyond his control and not produced by his 
own misconduct. Evidence of due care does not 
furnish an excuse or justification. The court in 
Bush v. Harvey Transfer Company, supra, points 
out the dnfference: 'Since the failure to comply 
with ... safety statute constitutes negligence per 
se, a party guilty of the violation of such a statute 
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cannot excuse himself from compliance by showing 
that he did or attempted to do what any reason-
able, prudent person would have done under the 
same or similar circumstances. A legal excuse 
must be something that would make it impossible 
to comply with the statute.' To the same effect, 
Florke v. Peterson, supra; Gallicotte v. Califor-
nia Mutual Building Loan Association, 4 Cal., 
App. 2d. 503, 41 P.2d 349." 
The Court then cites with approval the case of 
Nettleton v. James and the case of Sothoron v. TYest pre-
viously cited in this brief, and in reversing the trial 
court made the further statement: 
''The evidence as viewed most favorably to the 
defendant was not sufficient to make a question of 
legal excse one of fact for the jury. The violation 
of the statute without legal excuse constituted neg-
ligence in itself, and the court erred in submitting 
an issue of negligence to the jury." 
POINT III 
THE DAMAGES ESTABLISHED BY THE 
JURY WERE NOT EXCESSIVE, \YERE 
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, 
AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
This question has been before this court on numer-
ous occasions. We have reviewed all the cases cited by 
the appellants in their brief and have no quarrel with 
the principles set forth in those decisions. 
In the case of Pauly v. ll!lcC'artl!y, 109 lTtah 431, 
184 P.2d 123 (1947), cited hy the appellants, the Court 
stated as follows: 
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"The jury is allowed great latitude in assess-
ing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P.2d 865. The present 
cost of living and the diminished purchasing 
power of the dollar may be taken into considera-
tion when considering damages. Coke v. Timby, 
57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union 
Ry. & Depot Co., supra.'' 
In that case, the trial court remanded the net jury 
verdict of $50,000.00 to $35,000.00. The defendants not 
being satisfied with the remittitur appealed, claiming that 
the verdict was based on passion and prejudice. There 
\Yas evidence of permanent back injury in that case. 
The trial court has considerable discretion in the 
allowance or rejection of a motion for new trial based 
upon exceessive verdict. 
In the case of Eleg(J;nti v. Standard Coal ComJJally, 
50 Utah 585, 168 Pac. 266, also cited by the appellants, 
Justice Frick, in refusing to disturb the action of the 
trial court, said: (P. 269 of the Pac. Rept.) 
'' ... As pointed out in Jensen v. Denver & 
Rio Grande eR. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1192, 
1193, the power to grant new trials upon the 
ground of excessive verdicts can rarely be exer-
cised by this court, and the only power we ordi-
narily possess is to determine whether the trial 
court has abused its discretion in refusing to 
grant a new trial on that ground.'' 
In the case of llf orgarn v. Ogden Union Depot, 77 
Utah 325, 294 Pac. 541, in refusing to disturb a verdict 
sustained by the trial court, this court held : 
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"The question has been before this ~ourt a 
great number of times, and we have un1~ormly 
held that we are permitted to interfere w1th the 
verdict on this ground only when the facts are 
such that the excess can be determined as a matter 
of law, or that the verdict is so exceessive as to 
shock one's conscience and to clearly indicate pas-
sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the 
jury, and that the trial court, in passing on the 
question, clearly abused its discretion in permit-
ting the verdict to stand. (Citing cases) '' 
In the case of Paul v. Kirkendall, 123 Utah 627, 261 
P. 2d 670 (1953), in refusing to disturb the verdict in that 
case, which involved a $20,000.00 award for a back in-
jury to the wife and loss of consortium, this court, speak-
ing through Justice 1\fcDonough said : 
''Appellant claims here that damages awarded 
were so excessive as to appear prejudicial. Rule 
59-A (5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that a new trial may be granted on grounds of ex-
cessive or inadequate damages appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice. It is not enough, under this rule, nor nor 
under the code provision which it supplanted, 
merely to allege that the amount is exceessive. The 
amount of the verdict is ordinarily a matter ex-
clusively for the jury, and on the ground of ade-
quacy of the verdict alone the court may not in-
terfere with the jury's verdict unless it clearlY 
appears that the award was rendered under mi~­
understanding or prejudice .... Therefore, in re-
viewing the trial court's ruling denying the de-
fendant's motion for new trial on grounds of 
excesesiveness of damages awarded by the jury's 
verdict, this court is limited to a determination 
of whether such ruling was an abuse of discre-
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tion. The Supreme Court is slow to interfere with 
a trial court's ruling granting or refusing a new 
trial on questions relating to damages. Hirabelli 
v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 Pac. 1172; Shatelan 
v. rrhackeray, 98 Utah 525 100 P. 2d 191. The ques-
tion here on appeal, then, is a determination of 
whether the damages awarded bear no proper 
relation to the wrong suffered as shown by the 
evidence and in accordance with the instructions 
of the Court, so that this Court may exercise its 
power to set aside the verdict of the jury.'' 
Again we have no quarrel with the principle dis-
cussed by this court in the more recent case of Stamp Y. 
Union Pacific Ra.ilroad Co., 5 U. 2d 387, 303 P. 2d 279, 
in which the court ordered a remittitur of the Yerdict 
from $10,000.00 to $6,000. That case involved a tem-
porary eye injury with no permanent impairment of 
vision, and the court was of the opinion that the award 
made by the jury had no basis in fact and was so excessive 
as to shock the conscience and to clearly indicate passion 
and prejudice. In his specially concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Crockett made this pertinent observation: 
''The first such rule is that courts should exer-
cise great caution and forebearance in disturbing 
jury verdicts to the end that the important right 
of trial by jury is preserved. :Moreover, after the 
lower court has given its approval to the award hy 
refusing to set aside or modify the verdict, that 
much additional validity is thereby conferred upon 
it, and the appellate court, a fortiori, should be 
more reluctant to interfere with the jury verdict 
and the judgment of the court because of their 
advantaged position in having a first-hand view 
of the proceedings and will do so only when to per-
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mit it to stand would work a manifest injustice. 
(Citing cases.) '' 
To briefly summarize the points discussed by the 
Utah decisions, it would appear that: (1) The appellate 
court should interfere with the verdict only when the facts 
are such that the excess can be determined as a matter of 
law; or (2) that the verdict is so excessive as to shock 
one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, preju-
dice, or corruption on the part of the jury; (3) that the 
trial court, in passing on the question, clearly abused its 
discretion in permitting the verdict to stand ; ( 4) the fact 
that the trial court has given its approval to the verdict 
should dispose the appellant court to be more reluctant in 
disturbing the verdict because of the "advantaged posi-
tion'' of the trial court in having a first-hand vie\\- of 
the proceedings; unless failure to interfere by the appel-
late court would permit a manifest injustice; (5) that 
there should be a proper relationship between the verdict 
and the wrong suffered as disclosed by the evidence, in-
dicating that the jury faithfully followed the court's 
instructions. 
We earnestly contend that the application of all of 
these principles to the case at bar would result in the 
affirmance of the verdict and of the action of the trial 
court in denying the motion for new trial. \Y e have rather 
extensively summarized the medical evidence and the evi-
dence pertaining to plaintiff's injuries to assist the court 
in arriving at this conclusion. 
The plaintiff was 63 years of age and in the enjoy-
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ment of excellent health, for his age, never having suf-
fered from any serious health problem prior to the time 
of the accident. He was highly skilled in his vocation 
as an automobile mechanic, and although \YC agree that 
the X-ray pictures indicated arthritic degeneration in the 
plaintiff's spine, which is generally true as an incident 
to age, nevertheless the plaintiff had actively pursued his 
vocation without restriction of activity for 40 years prior 
to the collision, and although he owned his own garage 
and had some administrative duties, he spent two-thirds 
of his time ·working in overalls on the various repair jobs 
that came to him. He stated that it was about a year 
after the accident before he could do any car repair work 
at all, and then his work was restricted to manual tune-
up jobs which would not require him to get down under 
a car. He further stated it is now impossible for him to 
get under the dash of a car to fix any of the wires or 
change the gauges because h ecan 't hold his head under-
neath. He cannot get under a car and take do\Yll a trans-
missiOn. 
vVhen he was examined by Dr. Reese on September 
19, 1960, Dr. Reese observed that he had a stiff and pain-
ful neck with limitation of motion ranging from 50 per 
cent to 80 per cent, with definite muscle spasm, and Dr. 
Reese testified that, in his opinion, the accident was 
wholly and solely responsible for plaintiff's disability. 
He further expressed the opinion that the disability waR 
permanent. 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook, the orthopedic specialist, testi-
fied that the plaintiff has suffered 50 per cent loss of mo-
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tion to the neck involving all movements of the neck, and 
he evaluated plaintiff's permanent disability as 20 per 
cent impairment of the body as a whole, which he stated 
would impair plaintiff's ability to work as a mechanic. 
Dr. Holbrook recommended surgery for fusion of the 
cervical vertebrae involved, and recognizing the hazards 
attendant upon such an operation, felt that if the opera-
tion was successful, plaintiff's permanent bodily disabil-
ity would be reduced to 10 per cent, and he testified that 
the reasonable cost of such an operation would be ap-
proximately $1,000. Dr. Holbrook stated that plaintiff's 
permanent injury was the result of the collision and that 
the factors creating the need for the operation of the 
plaintiff "-ere caused by the collision. 
There can be no question but what plaintiff sustained 
a serious, painful, and disabling injury which will greatly 
impair his ability to perform his work and his enjoyment 
of life for as long as his life shall continue. Having 
arrived at the age of 63 without any serious health prob-
lem and still pursuing an active and useful life, the jury 
would have been fully justified in concluding that he had 
a reasonable life expectancy of several years. 
The amount of the verdict being fully justified by 
the evidence, does not even remotely suggest passion or 
prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury, and the 
appellants have brought nothing to the attention of the 
court, nor could they, which would justify this court in 
reducing the verdict or granting the motion for new trial, 
which the trial court, in the rea.sona ble exercise of its 
judgment, sa-w fit to sustain. Certainly, as recognized by 
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the previous decisions of this court, the jury was entitled 
to take into account the present purchasing power of 
money and the present conditions of inflation which 
would make a present-day verdict worth only about a 
third as much as a verdict in the same amount rendered 
10 or 13 years ago; and these cases, so far as discussion 
of the amounts involved are concerned, can be of little 
assistance to the court in determining what is just and 
proper today. However, for what it is worth, there is an 
Illinois case decided in 1950 (some 13 years ago) in which 
a $20,000.00 verdict was upheld for a whiplash injury to 
a woman's neck in \Yhich the woman had received hos-
pital care without surgery with continuing symptoms 
similar to those involved in the case at bar. Smith v. Kro-
ger Grocery arnd Baking Compatn,y (Illinois, 1950), Ill. 
App. 501, 90 N.E. 2d 500. 
We earnestly contend that under the evidence of in-
jury in this case, fully substantiated by the doctors who 
examined and treated the plaintiff, the jury would have 
been altogether justified in allowing a verdict consider-
ably greater than the one this court is asked to disturb. 
The amount of the verdict does not shock the conscience, 
nor does it indicate passion, prejudice, or a disregard of 
eYidence or the Court's instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly shows that the defendants were 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law through operating 
a motor vehicle on the highway with defective brakes and 
in approaching the intersection of 21st South and State 
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Street without maintaining a reasonable or proper look-
out. The record discloses no evidence excusing the de-
fendant's violation of his statutory duty with respect to 
the maintenance of his braking equipment. The evidence 
does not even show that the defendants exercised ordi-
nary care in the maintenance of their braking equipment. 
The trial court, therefore, had no proper alternative but 
to withdraw the issue of negligence efrom the considera-
tion of the jury. 
If we should assume against the record that the court 
erred in its instructions, the defendants failed to make a 
timely or appropriate objection - indeed, they flatly 
stated approval of the instructions given. The verdict 
was not exces~sive and did not indicate passion or preju-
dice but was fully justified by the evidence. 
The trial judge, having presided over the trial pro-
ceedings and having observed the witnesses, the parties, 
and the jurors in the exercise of his sound judgment and 
discretion denied the motion for new trial and refused to 
disturb the verdict. 
We therefore respectfully conclude that in accord-
ance with the well-established principles of law and jus-
tice set forth in this brief, the verdict and judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
351 So. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plarintiff 
and Respondent 
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